Abstract. Semifragile watermarking techniques aim to prevent tampering and fraudulent use of modified images. A semifragile watermark monitors the integrity of the content of the image but not its numerical representation. Therefore, the watermark is designed so that the integrity is proven if the content of the image has not been tampered with, despite some mild processing on the image. However, if parts of the image are replaced with the wrong key or are heavily processed, the watermark information should indicate evidence of forgery. We compare the performance of eight semifragile watermarking algorithms in terms of their miss probability under forgery attack, and in terms of false alarm probability under nonmalicious signal processing operations that preserve the content and quality of the image. We propose desiderata for semifragile watermarking algorithms and indicate the promising algorithms among existing ones.
Introduction
One prominent application of watermarking technology is the monitoring of the integrity of the multimedia documents. The specific interest in semifragile watermarking algorithms arises from the multitude of practical and commercial applications, where content needs to be strictly protected, but the exact representation during exchange and storage need not be guaranteed. The alterations on the documents can occur unintentionally or can be implanted intentionally. The so-called unintentional or innocent alterations typically arise from such diverse facts as bit errors during transmission and storage, or signal processing operations such as filtering, contrast enhancement, sharpening, and compression. Intentional or malicious alterations, on the other hand, are assumed to be due to an explicit forgery attempt by a pirate with the explicit purpose of changing the contents of a document. The main distinction then, is whether the content is altered as in malicious and intentional attacks or whether only the representation, but not the content, of the document is altered, as occurs in unintentional, nonmalicious cases. The line of demarcation between these two attacks categories is, however, not always clear-cut, as it depends very much on the application domain. A case in point is histogram equalization, where, if the representation of the lighting condition is considered informative, it then becomes a malicious manipulation; alternately, it remains simply a well-intentioned contrast enhancement.
There have been a significant number of watermarking algorithms aimed at tamper detection. One group of techniques, 1,2 called fragile watermarking algorithms, function as a strict tamper detection tool, in that they are intolerant of even a one-bit alteration. They are alternatively called cryptographic message digests, and can only validate original copies. On the other hand, semifragile tamper detection methods are designed to monitor changes in the content. In other words, they are capable, in principle, to differentiate between the innocent and malicious attack categories. Ideally, a semifragile tamper detector would gloss over innocent alterations on the image due, for example, to postproduction editing, mild compression, filtering, or contrast enhancement, but it should give an alarm whenever a content change occurs. Semifragile watermarking methods validate image content, but not its representation, and are thus judiciously made robust against allowable alterations, while being sensitive to nonpermitted modifications. Of course, if the signal processing operations are taken far enough, as in the case of high compression rates, they start changing not only the representation, but the content of the document as well, and they should then qualify as a mali-cious attack. The breakpoint between an innocent and a malicious attack is not well defined, and it depends on the application domain and document type. One can use, however, the reliability of the detected watermark as an authenticity measure of the document, and reach, for example, a tampered or nontampered decision by thresholding it.
There are several possible classifications of the tamperdetection and content-authentication watermarking techniques. 3, 4 • Visually authenticated ͑semi͒fragile watermarking, where typically a thumbnail or a visual pattern is hidden in the image, and tamper detection is based on the visual assessment of perceived differences by an operator, as in Marvel et al. 5, 6 • Statistically authenticated ͑semi͒fragile watermarking, where an estimate of tampering likelihood is obtained based on the correlation coefficient or measured mismatch between the inserted and recovered authentication sequences. In these techniques, the performance can typically be given in terms of probability of correct watermark sequence detection as a function of false alarm rate.
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Self-embedding techniques for proof of authenticity and image protection as in Fridrich and Goljan, 12 Lan and Tewfik, 13 and in the case of video in Robie and Mersereau. 14 Proposed algorithms can be self authenticating or independently authenticating.
• Self-authenticating algorithms are based on the validation of a robust hash, which was embedded and which is to be extracted again from the test image itself, as in the methods of Lin and Chang, 10,15 Fridrich, 8, [16] [17] [18] Xie, Arce, and Graverman, 19 and, to some extent, Hung, Cheng, and Chen. 20 • Independently authenticated algorithms receive validation based on an image-independent authentication sequence, as in the methods of Eggers, 7, 21 Fridrich, 16 Lin, Podilchuk, and Delp, 9 Queluz and Lamy, 22, 23 Kundur and Hatzinakos, 24, 25 Lan, Mansour, and Tewfik, 26 and Gwo, Lu, and Liao. 27 We plan to present a comparative assessment of the statistically authenticated, oblivious, semifragile watermarking techniques. 28 This excludes visually verified algorithms, such as Marvel, Hartwig, and Boncelet, 6 and Yeung and Mintzer, 2 or nonoblivious techniques as in Xie, Arce, and Graverman. 19 We measure the performance in terms of probability of miss when there is a forgery attack and in terms of probability of false alarm when there is no forgery, but the image is subjected to various mild signal-processing operations. Obviously, one desires to achieve low probability of miss ͕P M ͖ when there is a forgery attack, and at the same time, low probability of false alarm ͕P F ͖ when one deals with allowed signal processing operations. Thus, the work aims to test and compare the algorithms on the basis of their claim to semifragility, that is, resistance to mild signal-processing operations and their specificity to detect forgery. The forgery attack we experiment with is the substitution attack, which substitutes the semifragilely watermarked document with its original unwatermarked version. In Sec. 2, we give the rationale of considering the substitution attack as representative of malicious attacks.
The outline of the work is as follows. Section 2 describes the types of attacks that should rightly cause an alarm and the set of attacks against which the tamperdetection watermark should resist. The comparison method of semifragile techniques is also given. Section 3 describes the semifragile watermarking algorithms with brief descriptions of their insertion, extraction, and verification schemes. Section 4 provides comparative results and conclusions.
Methods for Comparison
The semifragile watermarking methods should be moderately robust to differentiate between malicious and nonmalicious attacks. However, the line of demarcation between the benign and malicious attacks is application and document dependent. In this study, we select the following list of manipulations based partly on examples in the literature and partly somewhat subjectively. We expect that the semifragile watermarking algorithms should not give false alarms against these permissible alterations:
• mild compression, for example up to 70% JPEG • histogram equalization ͑uniform distribution͒ • sharpening ͑unsharp masking filter with coefficients ͓Ϫ1Ϫ1Ϫ1; Ϫ1Aϩ8,Ϫ1; Ϫ1Ϫ1Ϫ1], where A ϭ1)
• low-pass filtering within a support of 3ϫ3 ͑equal weight coefficients equal to 1/9͒ • median filtering within a support of 3ϫ3 • additive Gaussian noise down to a signal to noise ratio of 35 dB • salt-and-pepper noise, up to 1% ͑value set to 255 and 0, respectively͒ • random bit errors in transmission and storage of the image in raw format, with a 0.001 probability of bit errors.
As pointed out in Sec. 1, it is arguable when and if these signal manipulations do not constitute an authenticity threat. Our aim, however, is first to prepare a list of algorithms with measured robustness and temper-sensitivity properties. Then, given an application scenario with specific robustness and tamper-sensitivity properties, in principle it should be possible to select the adequate algorithm.
The main content-altering manipulations that must generate tamper alarm, hence, the nonpermissible alterations, are the following:
• image forgeries intended to remove, substitute, or insert objects in the scene • image manipulations that modify the geometry of objects such as their rotation, flipping, translation, and scaling or image manipulations that change the appearance of objects such as color, shade, shadow manipulation, etc.
• changes in the scene background, for example, change of the time of day or changes in background texture such as forest, ocean, etc.
• cropping.
All manipulations that affect the geometry of the image such as flipping, rotation, cropping, etc., suffer from desynchronization and are thus automatically detectable by the algorithms considered. Consequently, manipulations such as mild cropping, or interpolation that could have been considered as innocent operations in certain circumstances, are eliminated. On the other hand, the manipulations of object insertion and deletion, and scene background changes, are tantamount to substitution. It follows then that the variety of forgery attacks considered before can be collapsed to substitution attacks only. Furthermore, we implement the substitution attack by replacing the watermarked image portion with its original version. There are two reasons for this specific choice. One is that the substitution of an image block with the original version would be the most difficult to detect, hence the most challenging attack. The second reason is that it is impractical to conceive and implement literally thousands of forgery attacks using commercial image-processing tools, and it would be very difficult to gauge and normalize the severity of the attacks. Thus, substitutions make it feasible to streamline forgery attacks. We used ten different images of size 512ϫ512, each watermarked ten times with different keys. The performance was measured in terms of the false alarm rate P F , which is the probability that image blocks indicate tampering in the absence of any malicious attack, and in terms of the miss probability P M , which is the percentage of maliciously attacked images that do not generate any tampering alarm. Notice that the substitution attack was block-based, and hence coincided with the grid structure of the algorithms. Random placements of the substituted blocks astride the grid structure of the algorithm would simply weaken the level of attack within the original blocks of the algorithms.
The eight semifragile watermarking methods that we tested are listed in Table 1 . As shown in Table 1 , different watermarking algorithms are conceived to protect image regions of different size. For example, some methods check for tampering on a pixel basis, others act on the basis of 8ϫ8, 16ϫ16, or 64ϫ64 blocks, while still others are designed to monitor row/column triples.
To achieve a normalized basis of comparison among the algorithms, we did two things: insertion strength normalization and footprint normalization. First, the insertion strength was standardized and all the tested algorithms were tuned to achieve two levels of document-towatermark ratio, namely, 38-and 41-dB peak signal-tonoise ratio ͑PSNR͒. The necessity of any watermarked image to possess PSNR above the lower limit of 38 dB was suggested in Kutter and Petitcolas. 29 Second, given the different footprint sizes on which the algorithms could detect evidence of tampering, we converted the footprint size to a standard 64ϫ64 block. In fact, we evaluated the P M and P F scores in two different ways, which we denote as native results and integrated results.
Native results. The performance figures are calculated on the basis of the image block size as proposed in the original work, hence called the native size. Thus, for example, the statistics for the Lin-Chang, Eggers-Girod methods were first collected on the basis of 8ϫ8 blocks, for Lin-Podilchuk-Delp on the basis of 16ϫ16 blocks, for LanMansour-Tewfik and Fridrich methods on the basis of 64 ϫ64 blocks, and for the Queluz method on the basis 3 ϫ128 pixel lines.
Integrated results.
To be able to compare performances over regions of the same size, the miss and false alarm rates of the prior native blocks are integrated to 64ϫ64-sized image blocks. It would have been desirable to compare algorithms on various sized block attacks, let's say from 4ϫ4 on to larger sizes. However, not all algorithms could function at all sizes, hence the only reasonable size at which all algorithms could compete was 64ϫ64. To convert the performance figures of an algorithm that was conceived for native blocks, ͑e.g., 8ϫ8 subblocks or 128-pixel columns͒ to P M and P F figures for the 64ϫ64 blocks, we calculated the probability of exceeding a threshold in the absence of attacks. We note that almost all semifragile methods give occasionally false alarms, even in the absence of any attack. Thus a 64ϫ64 region is declared as tampered if a sufficient number of its native blocks are found tampered. This critical threshold, that is, the number of falsealarming native blocks, was set at the 1% level for the 64 ϫ64 block in the absence of any attack.
In summary, the performance of the algorithms was measured on both their native sizes and the larger size 64 ϫ64. While no one algorithm was favored, the eight methods investigated and their characteristics are listed in Table 1 .
Semifragile Watermarking Algorithms
In this section, we briefly describe the semifragile watermarking schemes tested. For each algorithm, we outline the generation of the authentication sequence, the insertion, extraction, and verification procedures. In the sequel, we express the image at pixel location (x,y) as I(x,y), while to denote pixels of a particular block b, we use the notation I b (x,y). The block discrete cosine transform ͑DCT͒ coefficients are indicated by C b (p,q).
Lin-Chang Algorithm
Lin and Chang's algorithm 10, 15, 30 is conceived to tolerate, in particular, JPEG-style compression of the watermarked image. It is based on two properties of the DCT coefficient quantization, namely, 1. order invariance, where the order relation of DCT coefficient pairs remains unaltered after JPEG processing, if not set equal; and 2. coefficient invariance, where if a coefficient is quantized to an integer multiple of the step size, its value is not changed after JPEG compression with a smaller step size. A parallel algorithm is that of Hung, Cheng, and Chen, 20 which uses the block vector quantization ͑VQ͒ indices for authentication data. This algorithm, however, results in a large payload of VQ coefficients, and its performance turns out to be rather poor.
Authentication data. The authentication data consists of the ordinal relationship of three pairs of DCT coefficients chosen from 8ϫ8 blocks pair-wise coupled according to a random mapping. These coefficients are selected from a predetermined low-frequency path in the respective DCT blocks. Their ordinal relationship, which forms the authentication data, remains invariant under JPEG compression. An authentication bit is considered as 1 if the DCT coefficient in a selected path is greater than its paired partner; otherwise, the authentication bit is 0. In other words, for the coupled blocks, denoted as 1 and 2, we have the authentication information at the (p,q) coefficient:
Insertion method. The six bits extracted from a block pair are inserted in alternate DCT coefficients of the same block pair by forcing these coefficients to odd or even multiples of a JPEG50 quantization step size. If the bit to be inserted complies with the least significant bit of the carrier DCT coefficient divided by the quantization step size, then no change is made, otherwise, the coefficient is incremented by a one-step size amount. Since the embedding distortion may cause a change in the authentication bits, this procedure should be iterated a few times ͑typically three͒ before the DCT coefficients are stabilized.
Extraction and verification method. The extraction scheme is a replica of the insertion scheme, in that both the authentication bits are regenerated and the least significant bit ͑LSB͒ bits of the modulated DCT carrier coefficients are read off. An 8ϫ8 block is declared nontampered if at least five of the six inserted bits are verified. Otherwise, the block is considered as tampered.
Lin-Podilchuk-Delp Algorithm
Authentication sequence. The authentication sequence is a pseudo-random zero-mean, unit-variance Gaussian noise sequence. Its seed is controlled by a key but is otherwise independent of the document.
Insertion method. The Gaussian authentication sequence is placed in the upper triangular positions ͑excluding DC component͒ of an empty DCT matrix. Subsequently, the inverse DCT of the matrix is calculated and the resulting 16ϫ16 spatial pattern is mixed additively with the image DCT block at a given strength:
Finally, the block-wise inverse DCT yields the semifragilely watermarked image.
Extraction and verification method. The watermark in the image is estimated by suppressing image spectral components in every block while enhancing the presence of the watermark. To this effect, horizontal ͑column-wise͒ and vertical ͑row-wise͒ differences are calculated both for the test image and the spatial watermark pattern. These difference vectors from the horizontal (⌬ Col ) and vertical (⌬ Row ) sets are concatenated to form two sets, one derived from the test image, and the other from the watermark spatial pattern,
where ͉ denotes the concatenation operation. The verification is based on the correlation of the extracted data with the differenced version of the original watermark pattern, that is:
Egger-Girod Algorithm
Authentication data. The authentication data consist of a random binary sequence ͕d n ͖ embedded with a secret dither sequence ͕k n ͖.
Insertion method. The authentication message is embedded in cover image coefficients by a dithered quantization rule Q ⌬ ͕ ͖, where ⌬ is the step size corresponding to the strength of insertion, referred to also as the scalar Costa's scheme ͑SCS͒. The embedding is randomized by a pseudorandom dither sequence k n (0,1͔. The cover data selected for watermark insertion are the second through eighth coefficients in the zigzag order of the 8ϫ8 block DCT coefficients. The embedding rule for the n'th element can be written as
where Q ⌬ ͕.͖ indicates scalar uniform quantization with step size ⌬. This embedding scheme is controlled by two parameters: the quantization step size ⌬ and the scale factor ␣. Both parameters can be jointly tuned to achieve a good trade-off between the embedding distortion and detection reliability for a given noise variance of an additive white Gaussian noise ͑AWGN͒ attack.
Extraction and verification method. Watermark extraction consists of observing the quantization residual. The residual should be in the (Ϫ⌬/2,⌬/2) interval for a 0 authentication bit, and its absolute value should be in the ͑⌬/2, ⌬͒ interval for 1. The tampering decision is based on the likelihood test that determines whether the watermark sequence was embedded with key k n , or was not embedded with that specific key.
Fridrich's Algorithm
Authentication data. The authentication bits are generated as a robust visual hash of the 64ϫ64 image blocks. Each block is projected onto M ͑30͒ basis vectors, and their inner product is quantized to 1 bit. The quantization threshold is adjusted to make equal the occurrence of ones and zeroes. The basis vectors themselves are obtained by smoothing 2-D arrays of uniform random numbers. The authentication sequence is thus tied intimately to the image content. For robustness against low-pass filtering, a separate pattern obtained by a geometric sequence of real numbers with factor ␣, is obtained.
Insertion method. For each image block, a set of M random noise patterns of size 64ϫ64 are generated. The seeds for the random number generator are each different, and obtained by the concatenation of the block projection bit onto the i'th (iϭ1...M ) basis, the block identity number, and a random key. These M 64ϫ64 random patterns are summed and scaled to form a spread-spectrum signal, and they are made DC free and mixed additively to the middle one-third of the block DCT coefficients. In addition, after the block has been rendered zero-mean and fixed variance, its first 300 DCT coefficients are perturbed to conform to a given pattern of 1 and 0 indices. These indices are obtained via the modulo operation of the DCT coefficients with the geometrical sequence.
Extraction and verification method. The received image is divided into blocks of the same size, and the spreadspectrum signal is regenerated in the same way as in the insertion stage. This spread-spectrum signal is correlated with the middle third of DCT coefficients and compared with a threshold, which is adjusted to render the number of ones and zeros equal, as in the insertion stage. The tampering decision is based on the probability of obtaining k correct symbols out of M , that is P tamper ϭC(M ,k)2 Ϫk , where C(.) denotes the combinatorial function. In our experiments, we took M ϭ30 while kϭ22 to satisfy P f Ͻ0.01. For low frequency, a weighted correlation between attained indices of DCT coefficients and a watermark pattern is calculated.
Kundur-Hatzinakos Algorithm
Authentication sequence. The authentication data is a random sequence independent of the image content, called the tamper authentication function ͑TAF͒.
Insertion method. A four-level discrete wavelet transform ͑DWT͒ of the image is taken using Haar bases. The authentication bits are inserted in the wavelet coefficients by quantification to even or odd multiples of a step size, according to the polarity of the TAF sequence bit. More specifically, in a given band and a given position, only one of the randomly chosen horizontal, vertical, or diagonal components is marked. The quantization step size is given by ⌬ϭ2 l , where l denotes the resolution level, lϭ0 being the original image. The decision to map the wavelet coefficients to odd or even multiples of the quantization coefficient is randomized via a key.
Extraction and verification method. This stage mimics the insertion stage, in that the DWT of the test image is calculated, and the coefficients within which the bits were embedded are searched. The odd or even quantization state of the coefficients is estimated to obtain the hidden authentication sequence, which is to be compared with the regenerated sequence. A pixel at the 0 level ͑original image͒ is declared as tampered if the corresponding pixel in the fourth level appears tampered, or if the fourth level coefficient passes the test, the coefficients in the second and third levels both fail. The high miss probability of a 4ϫ4 block in a substitution attack is due to the fact that the fourth level pixel bit will not match 50% of the time, while the third and second level pixel bits will not match one eighth of the time, thus in total will check for error 62.5% of the time, or alternatively will miss 37.5% of the time.
Queluz Algorithm 31
The following information is based on Queluz and Lamy's research. Authentication data. The authentication data consists of a random sequence, independent of the image, inserted in quantized projections of rows and columns.
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Insertion method. Nonoverlapping image columns or rows are considered in groups of three. Each triad is projected onto three random basis functions, resulting in projection values P 1 , P 2 , and P 3 . We have observed that using the low-pass filtered version of these arrays improves the performance slightly. The resulting inner products are rank ordered as P [1] р P [2] р P [3] and a quantization step size ⌬ is calculated based on the span of these projections, which is ͉P [3] Ϫ P [1] ͉. The median projection P [2] is then quantized to odd or even multiples of the ⌬ step size according to the bit to be inserted.
Extraction and verification method. For each triad of lines, the embedded bit is extracted by computing the position of the median projection P [2] to the nearest boundary: if the parity of this boundary is even, a 0 is extracted; otherwise, a 1 is extracted. It is also required that the median projection be within a percentage of distance to its nearest boundary. A triad of lines is deemed tampered if its quantization state does not check the authentication bit. We take two rows ͑columns͒ concatenated at a time from the 64ϫ64 blocks, resulting in 128-pixel-long test lines.
Lan-Mansour-Tewfik Algorithm
Authentication data. The data consists of a binary watermark message that instruments the odd/even quantization of feature vectors.
Insertion method. DCT transform of the 8ϫ8 blocks of the image is first taken. The DCT coefficients of the same order, say all (i, j) coefficients, from the blocks of the image are collected into 64-long vectors using Hilbert scanning paths. Actually, the blocks are visited in a Hilbert scan, the (i, j)'th DCT coefficients form a string, whose length equals the number of blocks in the image ͑e.g., 4096 in an 512ϫ512 image͒, and then they are further partitioned into smaller subvectors of size 64. The subvectors become, in effect, the ensemble of DCT coefficients of the same order over a neighborhood, due to Hilbert scanning. These DCT subvectors are projected onto columns of the Hadamard matrix, and finally these projections are quantized to odd and even multiples of a step size.
Extraction method. The extraction process is the replica of the insertion method followed by reading off of the odd/ even quantization state of the projections. A tampering decision is based on the number of projections that does not satisfy the predetermined quantization state of the projections.
Gwo-Lu-Liao Algorithm
There are a number of algorithms, which in the quest for robustness, embed the information in the average value of blocks, and redistribute the change in the mean to the pixels. 27, 32, 34 We tested the algorithm in Ref. 27, which was described in more detail.
Authentication sequence. The authentication data is a random sequence independent of the image content.
Insertion method. Similar to the Kundur-Hatzinakos algorithm, 25 first a four-level DWT of the image is taken. Then the average value of a number of wavelet coefficients in one of the HH, LH, or HL bands is calculated. The 0 or Table 7 Performance of Queluz's semifragile watermarking on basis 128-pixel line triad projections. Overall, 20 line triads per 64ϫ64 block are considered, and the quantization step size is ⌬ϭ2.5 and ⌬ϭ3.7, respectively, to achieve 41-and 38-dB PSNR. Overall, 128,000 triads were tested.
Forgery attack Probability of miss P m 1 watermark bit value is imposed onto the block average using odd/even quantization step sizes. These step sizes are obtained from distributing the change to the block pixels, which effects this odd or even quantization of the block mean. The quantization step size is taken on the basis of wavelet frequency masking visibility coefficients, which depend on the level and orientation. Only levels 2 through 4 are used for embedding.
Extraction and verification method. This DWT of the test image is calculated and the block means are computed and checked to see if they verify the odd/even quantization condition. The decision fusion is done on level-2 pixels, which correspond to 4ϫ4 blocks of the original image.
Experimental Results
Eight semifragile watermarking methods have been described in Sec. 3 and their performance figures have been given according to their native block sizes in Tables 2  through 9 . For a comparative assessment, their watermarkto-document ratio, as given by the PSNR, was set to 38 and 41 dB. Sample error images resulting from semifragile watermarking at the 38-dB level are given in Fig. 1 . In these figures, for the sake of visibility, the error signal has been multiplied by a factor of 10 and it has been put on a pedestal of 128. To normalize the size of the tamper-control region, we have used an integration scheme to convert the native block size to a fixed control size of 64ϫ64. As it was explained in Sec. 1, this block size was imposed, in that it was the minimum effective dimension at which some algorithms 8 could work properly. On the other hand, 1/64th of a 512ϫ512 image appears as a reasonable tamper verification size. Notice that for each algorithm native size, the integration is done with a sliding window in steps of its native size, e.g., in steps of 8ϫ8 pixels for the Lin-Chang algorithm, and so forth.
The integration scheme uses the tamper and no-tamper decisions of the blocks with native sizes, and integrates them into a tamper/no-tamper decision for the 64ϫ64-sized block. We first determine the threshold level for each algorithm, which guarantees lower than 1% false alarm rate under the no attack case. Recall that all algorithms, when a verification test is applied, give rise to some level of false alarm even in the absence of any attack. More specifically, we have found experimentally the following false alarm thresholds, as in Table 10 .
In Tables 11 and 12 the miss and false alarm probability results are given for the 64ϫ64 regions.
The following comments can be made on the integrated performance of semifragile algorithms, that is, on 64ϫ64 blocks.
• Lin-Chang's algorithm: As expected the algorithm performs very well in the presence of JPEG compression, but otherwise it is very fragile against signalprocessing attacks.
• Lin-Podilchuk-Delp's algorithm: It is robust against almost all nonmalicious signal-processing operations, except for smoothing. We have observed that the use of Wiener filtering, to enhance the watermark signal, slightly improves the performance.
• Eggers-Girod's algorithm: This algorithm provides a statistically meaningful measure of tamper probability. It proves very robust against JPEG as it withstands ͑does not give false alarm͒ down to the JPEG quality factor of 30. It can withstand some signal-processing One can note that, as far as miss probability is concerned, all of them perform better than 1% ͑except Gwo-LuLiao's͒. On the other hand, they tend to differ widely in the false alarm rate among signal-processing attack types. We can prepare a scorecard for the algorithms based on their robustness against the signal-processing manipulations. As it was done in the case of Stirmark, 33 a score of 1 is given whenever the false alarm rate is below 5%, and 0 otherwise. It appears then that, based on the previous P F and P M thresholds, the Fridrich, Eggers-Girod, and Lin-PodilchukDelp algorithms obtain the highest scores.
Conclusions
The comparative simulation experiments reveal that almost all algorithms ͑except Gwo-Lu-Liao and Lan-MansourTewfik͒ do well on detecting the substitution forgery, and have also low false-alarm probability under the no-attack situation. On the other hand, it is interesting to observe they are all more or less sensitive to image smoothing opera- tions. Since the successful performance of an algorithm depends entirely on the context of its application, the following remarks can be made on the merit points. The merit points we consider are: the claim to semifragility, that is, resisting selected signal operations; and giving statistically sound figures of tamper probability. The tamper indication must be statistically sound. In this respect, the Fridrich, Eggers-Girod, and Lin-PodilchukDelp ͑the latter under Gaussian assumption͒ algorithms output statistically sound tamper probability, while the others indicate tampering only on the basis of the count of bit errors between the test and actual sequences.
The tamper detection block size should be flexible, as the attack size can vary from a line consisting of a few tens of pixels long to the entire image plane itself. In this respect, Fridrich's and Lan-Mansour-Tewfik's algorithms are the least flexible, as they cannot function reliably for sizes below 64ϫ64. Also, the Lin-Podilchuk-Delp algorithm necessitates 16ϫ16 block size for operation, which is larger than the minimum sizes of all the rest.
There is another aspect to the block size, which is the ease with which the tamper indication of smaller blocks can be integrated to the tamper indication of a larger block, if we suspect that an image region larger than the native size of the algorithm has been affected. Thus if the native size is 8ϫ8, one would like to predict the tamper likelihood over a larger region, say 32ϫ32 or 64ϫ64. When integrating scores, the sporadic native block alarms not due to malicious attack tend to be averaged out, while consistent evidences in the small blocks give a more reliable indication. In this respect, the Eggers-Girod algorithm provides the most straightforward formula for integration, as it simply sums the tamper/no-tamper likelihood of the coefficients subtended by the block. The Lin-Podilchuk-Delp algorithm can also be easily run over different sized blocks.
Semifragility, that is, robustness against selected signalprocessing attacks, could be a desirable aspect, while we quickly point out that when and where a signal manipulation is considered as malicious or innocent depends on the application context. When algorithms are compared with respect to their robustness against signal-processing operations, using the scoring method suggested at the end of Sec. 4, one can conclude that the Eggers-Girod, Fridrich, LinPodilchuk-Delp algorithms perform uniformly well to a reasonable extent.
Notice that there could be other merit criteria, such as an autocorrecting capability, the ease with which a method can be attacked, etc.
In conclusion, we provide a comparative performance analysis of semifragile algorithms in detecting forgery at- tempts in the guise of substitution attack and in being semifragile, that is, not giving false alarms in the face of selected mild signal-processing operations. While in this comparison no specific application context was envisaged, the simulation results would hopefully guide a designer to select the algorithms according to specific fragility and robustness characteristics, as dictated by the application context.
